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This paper explores the extent to which discrimination against foreign applicants in
the trademark registration process can be used as a “behind-the-border” barrier to
imports. Prima-facie evidence shows that in some developing countries the ratio of
trademark registration to applications is much higher for national than for foreign
applicants, which is consistent with the notion of discrimination against foreign ﬁrms.
A simple model is developed that suggests that incentives to discriminate are stronger
when foreign ﬁrms produce products that are close in quality to the product produced
by domestic ﬁrms. This hypothesis is then tested and empirically conﬁrmed in three
of the four countries in our sample, suggesting that discretion and discrimination in
the trademark registration process can sometimes be used as a protectionist tool.
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Dating from antiquity, craftsmen’s marks have been employed to identify the name of the
maker and prevent fraud. Trademarks serve the purpose of helping consumers to distinguish
those quality features that are not observable at the moment of the purchase of the product,
such as the freshness of edibles or the reliability of a hard disk. Allowing economic agents to
register trademarks, governments aim at reducing consumers’ search costs and, indirectly,
at stimulating ﬁrms to increase or maintain the quality and variety of standards of their
trademarked products.
A potential problem with trademark protection — as with any regulatory instrument— is
that it may be subject to political capture. By allowing certain ﬁrms to register their trade-
marks and not others, or by applying diﬀerent standards to the enforcement of trademark
legislation, an important commercial advantage can be granted to some ﬁrms. This paper
explores the extent to which trademark registration discriminates against foreign ﬁrms — by
not granting (or delaying) their trademark registration — becoming an additional weapon in
the protectionist arsenal. Indeed, as traditional trade barriers, such as tariﬀsa n dq u o t a s ,
have been eliminated in the developing world, much of the attention in the policy debate
has shifted to the so-called “behind-the-border” barriers to trade.
Prima facie evidence for four developing countries suggests that there could be some
discrimination in the registration process against foreign ﬁr m si na tl e a s tt w oo ft h ef o u r
countries under examination (China, Hong Kong, India and South Africa). A simple model
is then developed to show that discrimination is more likely to occur when products oﬀered
by foreign ﬁrms are of similar quality to the ones produced by domestic ﬁrms. This im-
plication of the model is then tested for each of the four countries. Results are consistent
with the alleged trademark protectionism in three of the four countries, the exception being
China.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Dating from antiquity, craftsmen’s marks have been employed to identify the name of the
maker and prevent fraud. One of the many forms of intellectual property rights, trade-
marks are deﬁned in the current economic and law literature as words, symbols or other
signiﬁers used to distinguish a good or service produced by one ﬁrm from the services or
goods produced by another ﬁrm (Landes and Posner 1987). Therefore, a “trademark” is
also “an element of a process of communication...which typically originated with the owner
or seller of a product and which is received by a prospective buyer of that product” (Papan-
dreou 1956). Tied to the dynamics of communication, a function of information is clearly
performed by a trademark, along with one of inﬂuencing, through the provision of such
information, the ﬁnal choice of the prospective buyer toward the purchase of that speciﬁc
product.
Allowing economic agents to register trademarks, governments aim then at reducing
consumers’ search costs and, indirectly, at stimulating ﬁrms to increase or maintain the
quality and variety of standards of their trademarked products. Trademarks serve indeed
the purpose of helping consumers to distinguish those quality features that are not ob-
servable at the moment of the purchase of the product, such as the freshness of edibles
or the reliability of a hard disk. Faced with a choice between two identical products, the
consumer would only have a 50 percent chance to pick the one that incorporates the desired
unobservable features. On the supply side, it would not be proﬁtable for ﬁrms to incur
higher costs for (unobservable) quality improvements if these could not be signalled to the
prospective buyers to justify a higher sale price. In a market with information asymmetries,
without a collective enforcement of trademark rights, there would be no incentive for qual-
ity improvements, the level of average quality would drop, and, at the extreme, the market
for high-quality products would disappear. If the buyer does not know the quality level
of the product she is about to purchase, but only the distribution of quality in the whole
market, she will only be willing to pay the price of the average-quality product. Expect-
i n gt ob eo ﬀered only the price of an average-quality product, the sellers of above-average
quality products will soon drop oﬀ that market. If buyers are rational and anticipate this
1move from the sellers of high-quality products, they may oﬀe rt op a ya ne v e nl o w e rp r i c et o
the remaining producers, which induces further exit from the group of producers of above-
average quality goods. This continues until high-quality goods are driven out of the market
and only the lowest quality good remains (Akerlof, 1970). It follows that, by protecting
trademark rights, public authorities secure the existence of markets for high-quality goods,
through the reduction of information asymmetries between sellers and buyers. Trademark
protection both helps reduce search costs for consumers and induces increase of quality
standards for ﬁrms. Excluding companies with clear hit-and-run strategies, ﬁrms that have
a long-term business horizon and care about establishing their reputation will draw crucial
advantages from the public enforcement of trademark rights.1
A potential problem with trademark protection — as with any regulatory instrument— is
that it may be subject to political capture. By allowing certain ﬁrms to register their trade-
marks and not others, or by applying diﬀerent standards to the enforcement of trademark
legislation, an important commercial advantage can be granted to some ﬁrms. This paper
explores the extent to which trademark registration discriminates against foreign ﬁrms — by
not granting (or delaying) their trademark registration — becoming an additional weapon in
the protectionist arsenal.2 By not granting (or delaying) trademark registration to foreign
producers, the trademark oﬃce can eﬀectively shift proﬁts from foreign to home producers.
The incentives to do so are explored in a situation with one domestic ﬁrm and a number
of foreign ﬁrms operating in the home market. The results suggest that the government
of the home country will have stronger incentives to discriminate against products similar
in quality to the ones produced by the domestic ﬁrm. The idea is that by not granting
registration to products of relatively similar quality the government is able to shift proﬁts
1While a thorough analysis of the reasons for and against trademark protection are clearly beyond the
scope of this paper, it is worth signalling that the costs of drafting laws, maintaining a trademark register
and a registry, along with the administrative and judicial apparatuses necessary to deal with securing and
sanctioning trademark rights may not always be oﬀset by the increase in both consumers’ and producers’
surpluses associated with trademark enforcement.
2Discrimination in the enforcement of trademarks can also potentially be used as a discriminating tool.
Note that, by explicitly doing so, the discriminating government would violate its national treatment
obligations in Article 2 of the Paris Convention (administered by WIPO) and therefore the WTO’s TRIPS
agreement. But agreements being incomplete contracts, there may be room for circumventing obligations.
2to domestic ﬁrms without excessively hurting consumers.
The empirical part of this paper focuses on four developing countries, where a majority
of trademarks are held by non-resident ﬁrms (the reverse is true in high-income countries;
see Baroncelli, Fink and Javorcik 2003). The four countries are China, Hong Kong, India
and South Africa. Section 2 oﬀers some prima-facie evidence of discrimination against for-
eign applicants in the trademark registration process of each of the four countries. Section
3 puts forward an analytical model to explore incentives to discriminate against foreign
applicants. Section 4 provides the empirical methodology, and section 6 shows the results.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Trademark Protectionism: Prima-facie Evidence
To assess the degree of discrimination against foreign applications in the area of trademark
registration, we constructed the following indicator of discrimination against foreign ﬁrms,











i is the number of trademarks registrations processed by the national trademarks
oﬃce in the name of residents (home producers) in sector i; aH is the number of trademarks
applications ﬁled directly with the national trademarks oﬃces in the name of residents
(home producers) in sector i; rF
i,c is the number of trademark registrations in sector i
received by national trademarks oﬃces in the name of non-residents from country c plus
designations under either the Madrid Agreement or the Madrid Protocol (“which have not
been the subject of a refusal of protection or which are no longer open to such refusal”); and
aF
i,c is the number of applications ﬁled in sector i directly with the national trademarks oﬃce
in the name of non-residents from country c plus the number of trademarks designations
under the Madrid Agreement or Protocol.3
3The data on registrations are from Baroncelli, Fink and Javorcik (2003). The data on applications are
from WIPO’s CD-ROM on trademarks. The Madrid Agreement of 1891 and the Madrid Protocol of 1989
3Our indicator is used as a proxy measure of the rate of transformation of domestic
applications into valid registrations, compared to the same ratio when the applicant is a
foreign individual or a foreign company (either a person that is not resident within the
territorial jurisdiction of the reporting country — hereafter referred to as “destination” —
or a company that has not been incorporated in the same territorial jurisdiction).4 Values
greater than one indicate that the rate of transformation is higher for domestic applicants
and that discrimination against foreign applicants may be present. A high variation in
this ratio across industries (even though values may be smaller than one) can also reﬂect
discrimination in some sectors against foreign producers.
In China and Hong Kong, for example, the manufacturing average ratio d is around
0.8 and 0.7 respectively5. All manufacturing sectors had an average d below 1, suggesting
that there is no evidence of discrimination against foreign ﬁrms trying to register their
trademarks. On the other hand in India and South Africa, the manufacturing average ratio
d is 1.3 and 1.5 respectively, suggesting that discrimination against foreign ﬁrms may be
present, as on average domestic applications are more likely to ﬁnalize in registration.
There are 24 manufacturing sectors in South Africa that had a discrimination indicator
d above 1, and 20 sectors in India out of potentially 34 manufacturing sectors in WIPO’s
NICE classiﬁcation. The discrimination indicator reached values above 2 for 4 manufactur-
ing sectors in South Africa and 6 in India. The four sectors in which South Africa seems
ap r i o r ito discriminate the most against foreign ﬁrms in terms of trademark registration
are: ropes and strings (with d =3 .5), varnishes sector (d =2 .6), agriculture products
n.e.c. (d =2 .2), and furniture and mirrors (d =2 .0). Other sectors with a value of the
discrimination index above 1 include musical instruments, common metals, hand tools and
implements, vehicles, building material, textile, clothing and footwear, meat ﬁsh and poul-
try, coﬀee, tea and cocoa, beers and soft drinks, alcoholic beverages, and tobacco. The
substantially reduce the transaction costs involved in registering trademarks by allowing ﬁrms that reside
in member states to ﬁle a single international application for registration in multiple countries. For more
on data sources and construction of variables, see the Appendix B.
4One can imagine that foreign ﬁrms that are domestically established may also be subject to discrimi-
nation. This unfortunately cannot be analyzed with the data that is available to us.
5Note that in Hong Kong all services industries have a ratio d above 1, probably signalling discrimination
in sectors where the Hong Kong economy is specialized.
4six sectors where the discrimination index takes values above 2 in India are: ﬁrearms and
ammunitions (d =4 .9), meat and ﬁsh products (d =3 .3), lace and embroidery (d =2 .9),
leather (d =2 .4), hand tools and implements (d =2 .3), carpets and mats (d =2 .0). Other
sectors with a value for the discrimination index above 1 in India include: household and
kitchen utensils, paints and varnishes, games and playthings, agricultural and horticul-
tural products n.e.c., coﬀee and tea, precious metals, common metals, textiles, bleaching
preparations, and apparatus for lighting.
There is also a signiﬁcant variation in terms of discrimination across foreign source
countries applying for trademark registration in all four destination countries (see Figures
1 to 4). In China, Argentina, Greece and Israel face a discrimination index above 1.5,
indicating that the ratio of registration to applications is approximately 50 percent higher
for domestic applicants than for applicants from any of these countries. In Hong Kong,
applicants from Portugal and Russian Federation face an average discrimination ratio above
1.5. In India, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Finland and the Russian Federation are
the countries with discrimination ratio above 1.5. Finally, in South Africa applicants from
Argentina, China, Finland, Hungary, India, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal
face a discrimination index above 1.5.
Thus, there seems to be prima-facie evidence that there is some degree of discrimination
in the registration process against foreign applicants in the four countries under examina-
tion. However, two points need to be raised. First, a value of the average discrimination
index below 1 does not mean there is no discrimination to be detected at all. For example,
if foreign ﬁrms were to have a better (less costly) application technology, discrimination
against foreign ﬁrms would be consisttent with a value of d below 1. The cross-industry and
cross-country variation in the registration discrimination index, d,c o u l dp r o v i d ei m p o r t a n t
information that could help us identify the presence or absence of discrimination against
foreign trademark applicants regardless of the average discrimination index. This is the ap-
proach followed in the next section, where we provide an analytical framework which allows
us to identify incentives to discriminate against diﬀerent country/sectors. Moreover, the
absence of discrimination in the registration process tell us very little about overall discrim-
5ination in trademark regulation. The crucial source of discrimination could be present in
the enforcement of the trademark registration rather than on the registration of trademarks
themselves. For instance, the fact that China seems to exhibit little discrimination in the
registration process is perfectly consistent with strong discrimination on the enforcement
of trademark regulations. Unfortunately, we have no data on enforcement and therefore a
complete exercise is not possible.
Second, one may wonder how countries can discriminate against foreign applicants if
diﬀerent conventions and international agreements prevent them from doing so6. A possible
answer is the excess discretion granted to trademark oﬃces or the lack of clear rules for the
adjudication of trademarks. For example, the Chinese Trademark Law of 1983 (amended
in 1993) and the Implementing regulations set very few deadlines for either the Trademark
Oﬃce or the Trade Review and Adjudication Board to give feedback to private entities.
For example, after being notiﬁed of a refusal by the Trademark Oﬃce on grounds of non
conformity, such as identity or similarity with another (national) registered or preliminary
approved trademark, the (foreign) applicant has 15 days to apply to the Trademark Review
and Adjudication Board for a review. No deadlines are set either in the law (Art. 21) or in
the Implementation regulations (Rules 16 and 17) concerning when the Trademark Oﬃce
or the Board need to notify the application.
India had no provisions for well-known marks until the new Trademark Act was passed in
1999. This implies that well-known foreign marks had no guarantee of having their rights
enforced under the Trade and Merchandise Act of 1958.7 Note that the data presented
above and used in the empirical section are for the period 1994-1998 (see the Appendix B)
and therefore correspond to regulations under the old trademark law. Another problem of
6Note that there is currently a trade dispute in the WTO regarding (potential) discrimination against
foreign applicants of trademarks (and geographical indications) regulations for agricultural products and
foodstuﬀ in the European Union. The case was brought up by the United States and Australia and other
countries have requested to be third parties.
7Discretion in the interepretation of the law also explains why two restaurants in South Africa were
allowed to use the name “McDonald’s” after McDonald’s corporation missed a deadline to renew its regis-
tration in the early 1990s. It took multiple lawsuits and a reversal by the Supreme Court of South Africa
of an earlier decision by a lower court to McDonald’s to get the rights to its world famous name (case no.
547/95).
6the old law that has now been remedied is the absence of an Appellate Board. However, the
extent of discretion granted to the Trademark Registrar continues to be important in some
areas. For example, in the area of application examination, Section 4 of Article 18 of the
Indian 1999 Trademark Act states that the Registrar is entitled to refuse an application or
to subject its validity to compliance of amendments, modiﬁcations, conditions or limitation
“if any, as he may think ﬁt”. The new law also contains some regulations that discriminate
against foreigners when it comes to opposition to an advertised application. Article 21
grants discretion to the Registrar to ask for a security deposit to be provided in case the
opponent to the application is a foreign individual or a foreign ﬁrm that neither resides nor
carries its business within the territory of India. The law does not provide for any speciﬁc
sum or a range of payment, so the discretion retained by the Registrar seems unlimited,
as is the scope of deterrence against a foreigner willing to secure her trademark rights in
India.
3 Trademark Protectionism: An Analytical Setup
In the following we present a theoretical model that can explain the occurrence of dis-
crimination in trademark registration against certain producers. A single ﬁrm in the home
country produces a good that is only consumed domestically. The domestic ﬁrm competes
with n foreign producers, each of which sells on the domestic market. The goods is verti-
cally diﬀerentiated, that is, its quality level qi may vary. Producers face the same per unit
cost function C(q)=q2. There is a unique level of quality qi corresponding to each country
i and we take the quality levels chosen by each producer as given. The price received for
the good by each producer equals p(q)=C(q)+π,w h e r eπ is a ﬁxed proﬁtp e ru n i to f
good sold. The government of the home country knows the variety of qualities available in
the domestic market and can rank them, q1... ≤ qd ≤ ... ≤ qn,w h e r eqd is the quality of
the domestically produced good. Since the price of good only depends on the quality level
chosen and not on the amount sold, the proﬁts of the domestic producer are simply simply
π multiplied by quantity of qd sold on the domestic market.
7Quality is not observable ex-ante by consumers which diﬀer in their taste for quality,
or marginal willingness to pay, denoted by a continuous and uniformly distributed variable
θ ∈ [θlow,θhigh].W en o r m a l i z et h er a n g eo fθ t ob eb e t w e e n0a n d1 .E a c hc o n s u m e rb u y s1
unit of the good of quality qi, if the net utility of doing so is greater than or equal to zero:
U(θ,q i)=θqi − p(qi) ≥ 0 (2)
In the absence of registered trademarks consumers cannot observe the actual quality level of
the good. If the only registered trademark is the domestic one, all foreign brands disappear
from the market, except the generic one with quality level qlow, because consumers can
not distinguish between the high quality good and the generic one. The authorization to
register only the domestic good eﬀectively cuts the market into two segments: consumers
that value high quality will buy the domestic brand and all others will buy the generic
(no trademark) foreign product. This can be seen by focusing on a simpliﬁed consumer
problem with one registered trademark (domestic). Consumer’s problem becomes:
Max{θqd − p(qd),θqlow − p(qlow)} (3)









In the absence of registered foreign trademarks the market share of the domestic ﬁrm is
θhigh− θ
∗ with the remaining consumers θ
∗ − θlow buying the generic foreign good.
Allowing foreign ﬁrms to register their trademarks reduces the informational asymmetry
between the producers and the consumers, giving the latter more options to choose from.
The market becomes segmented corresponding to the number of brands registered on the
domestic market. Consumers maximize their net utility given the observed quality levels
available and their marginal willingness to pay. Consumers with higher θ choose better-
8quality goods. Figure 5 illustrates the consumer’s optimal choice depending on her θ.E a c h
curve represents the net level of utility associated with a certain quality level qlow <q 1 <
qd <q high.I ff o r e i g nﬁrms producing goods of quality q1 and qhigh are not allowed to register
their trademarks, so that only the domestic brand and the generic brands are available,
any consumer with θ ≥ θ
∗ will purchase the domestic brand, as suggested by (4), and the
rest will buy qlow.
If, on the other hand, foreign ﬁrms are allowed to register their trademark products of
quality levels q1 and qhigh,o n l yc o n s u m e r sw i t hθ1 ≤ θ ≤ θ2 will consume the domestic
brand, signiﬁcantly reducing the market share of the domestic ﬁrm and causing losses
to its total proﬁts. Thus, by preventing foreign trademark registration, the government
can increase the domestic ﬁrm’s market share, at the cost of lower utility for consumers,
corresponding to the shaded area in Figure 5.
We assume that the government has perfect information about the quality levels of the
goods originating in each country and controls trademark registration. It maximizes the
social welfare, which is the sum of producer and consumer welfare:









where π and ∆θ are the per unit proﬁt and the market share of the domestic ﬁrm, re-
spectively, qi is the quality of the good produced in country i and θi is the market share
of that country. Thus, the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is the domestic proﬁts and
the two last terms are consumer surplus of consumers buying the domestic and the foreign
goods, respectively. The government maximizes W by choosing which brands are permitted
to register their trademarks. Note that, by changing the variety of the registered foreign
goods available to the domestic consumers through trademark protection, the government
aﬀects the market segmentation. The market shares of home and foreign ﬁrms are aﬀected
by the government’s decision to accept or to decline trademark applications.
Discriminating against foreign ﬁrms can be optimal from a welfare perspective in the
same sense that tariﬀs can be optimal in a world with imperfect competition, as they shift
9proﬁts away from foreign ﬁrms to domestic ﬁrms. Thus, the proﬁt-shifting argument is
present in this setup and can justify the use of discrimination towards foreign ﬁrms, which
leads to an increase in domestic ﬁrms’ market share and proﬁts. However, as it can be seen
in Figure 5, consumers lose from discrimination, since there are fewer choices available.
Discrimination against country 1 leads to disappearance of q1 from the market, forcing the
consumers that earlier chose that good to pick either qd or qlow.C o n s u m e r s l o c a t e d t o
the right of θ
∗ choose the domestic product and the ones located to the left of θ
∗ pick the
generic good. This shift induces welfare losses for that particular group equal to the shaded
area.
Consider the situation when the domestic good is the one of lowest quality relative to
the imported goods, as depicted in Figure 6. This a realistic assumption in the case of de-
veloping countries, where domestically produced goods in some sectors could be considered
inferior to foreign goods. First note that if all trademarks are registered initially, there is
no point in removing trademark registration for a foreign brand that is of a very diﬀerent
quality than the one produced domestically. In terms of Figure 6, removing trademark reg-
istration for qhigh or q2 when q1 is present has no impact on the market share of the domestic
ﬁrm, which continues to sell to consumers with θ ≤ θ1. On the other hand, disappearance
of, for instance, q2 reduces consumer welfare, since those who previously bought this good
a r en o wf o r c e dt oc h o s eb e t w e e nq1 and qhigh. It follows that the country unambiguously
loses from discriminating against country 2.
Starting from a situation when all countries are allowed to register their trademarks
on the domestic market, it is welfare-improving to discriminate against q1 if and only if
the extra proﬁts created exceed the welfare losses to consumers. The change in consumer



















Discrimination against q1 involves welfare losses to consumers, but the domestic ﬁrm’s
proﬁts increase as more people buy the local good. The market share of the domestic ﬁrm
10increases by θ2− θ1 as the result of discrimination. The total welfare change is ∆W1 =
π(θ2 − θ1)+∆CS1. Discrimination will occur if the expression is positive.
When q1 is prohibited from trademark registration, the next step for the government is
to decide whether to carry out further discrimination and deny trademark registration to
country 2. Disappearance of q2 gives the domestic ﬁrm yet greater share of the market. The
welfare change in this situation is ∆W2 = π(θ4 − θ2)+∆CS2,w h e r e∆CS2 is calculated
in a manner similar to ∆CS1 in (6). We analyze the relationship between ∆W1 and
∆W2 in the special case of quality levels that are distributed evenly in the quality space:
q1 − qd = q2 − q1 = qhigh − q2 = ∆q. In Appendix A we show that if initially it is welfare
improving to discriminate, the incentive to do so subdue when the next-best foreign brand
is considered, that is ∆W1 ≥ ∆W2. The reasoning can be extended to other quality levels,
such that the positive welfare change which induces discrimination initially falls the further
we move away from the quality level of the domestically produced good. Assuming it were
welfare improving to discriminate against q1, at some point the losses to consumers caused
by subsequent discrimination outweigh the extra proﬁts accruing to the domestic ﬁrm.
Thus, a country discriminates against countries that export goods similar in quality to the
one produced by domestic ﬁrm and allows trademark registration of brands very diﬀerent
from the domestic one. In other words, if trademark registration is used as a protectionist
tool, then discrimination is more likely in the case of foreign ﬁrms that produce goods
similar in quality to the domestic ones. This will be the basic assumption explored in the
empirical section of the paper.
4 Trademark Protectionism: Empirical Methodology
To test for the presence of protectionist rationale behind discrimination in trademark regis-
tration we explore the correlation between the registration discrimination index developed
in section 2 and a proxy for quality diﬀerences between domestic and foreign ﬁrms. More
speciﬁcally, for each of the four countries under examination (China, Hong Kong, India
11and South Africa) we run the following regression:
di,c = β1∆qi,c + β2mc + β3αi +  i,c (7)
where di,c is the trademark registration discrimination index in industry i for products
originating in country c, ∆qi,c is the absolute value of the diﬀerence in quality in products
of industry i produced in country c versus products of the same industry produced in
the home country (China, Hong Kong, India or South Africa); αi is an industry dummy
included to capture any industry speciﬁce ﬀect (e.g., higher trade protection in a particular
industry or better organized lobbies); mc is the share of imports from country c in total
imports of the destination country, and  i,c is an i.i.d error term. A negative β1 indicates
that as the diﬀerence in quality between domestic and foreign products increases, there
is less discrimination against foreign ﬁrms. This will be consistent with the notion of
trademark protectionism explored in the previous section. Import share mc is included to
test whether discrimination is more likely to occur in cases where the exporting country
already has a large share of the domestic consumption of foreign goods. This could happen,
if we assume that a large import share means that the goods imported from that particular
country are similar in quality to the domestic goods (based on the Linder hypothesis). A
positive β2 would then strengthen the argument that discrimination is stronger in the cases
of close resemblance between foreign and domestic products.
The quality level of products in a particular industry i is captured by the share of sector
i’s exports to the QUAD (Canada, European Union, Japan and the United States) in total
industry exports. The diﬀerence in quality between products produced in the home country
and its trading partners is therefore calculated as ∆qi,c = |si,H − si,c|,w h e r esi,c is the share
of industry i’s exports to the QUAD in country c’s total exports of i. In the case of QUAD
members’ exporters, we also include their sales at home in the calculation of si,c. Subscript
H stands for the home country (i.e., destination country): China, Hong Kong, India and
South Africa. We propose taking the diﬀerence rather than the ratio when measuring ∆qi,c
in order to avoid losing observations when exports to the QUAD of country c are equal to
zero. Note however that estimates using the ratio are qualitatively identical to the ones
12reported in Tables 1 and 2.
The basic assumption for using this ratio as an indicator of product similarity is that
products consumed in the QUAD are of relatively high quality, as QUAD consumers (i.e.,
consumers in rich countries) have higher θst h a nc o n s u m e r si nt h er e s to ft h ew o r l d .T h i s
hypothesis was ﬁrst put forward by Linder (1961). Fink, Javorcik and Spatareanu (2003)
and Hallak (2003) have recently provided some empirical evidence in favor of this assump-
tion using very diﬀerent approaches. Thus, if a pair of countries are exporting a similar
share of their exports to rich countries, then it is likely that the products they produce are
of similar quality.
Alternatively, the diﬀerences in quality levels could be captured by prices (or per unit
import values) of the domestic and the imported goods. An important caveat is that we
would need to compare very speciﬁc products. Our trademark protection data, however,
are aggregated at the industry levels — we can not calculate discrimination index for each
particular good. For example, for each exporting country we have discrimination index for
textiles and apparel sector, but comparing the quality of a "representative" good in this
sector does not seem feasible, since we can only obtain per unit prices of speciﬁcg o o d s ,
s u c ha sm e n ’ ss h i r t so rT - s h i r t s .
5 Empirical Results
Table 1 shows the results of the estimation of equation (7) using a pool of the four destina-
tion countries, with and without industry dummies (αi), with and without home destination
country dummies and with and without aggregate import shares from each source country.
All six regressions reported in Table 1 show a negative and signiﬁcant relation between
diﬀerences in product quality and discrimination against foreign ﬁrms in the trademark
registration process. The three last regressions also show that aggregate import shares
enter positively into the equation explaining discrimination. This implies that the larger
are imports from a particular country, the more likely is that country to be discriminated
against, which would also support our theoretical prediction if one assumes that the Linder
13hypothesis holds (i.e., countries that produce and consume similar products trade signiﬁ-
cantly with each other).
Table 2 provides estimates of equation (7) by country for each of our 4 destination
countries (China, Hong Kong, India and South Africa), but excluding the aggregate im-
port share variable mc. Three of the four countries in the sample show again a negative
and signiﬁcant correlation between quality diﬀerences and discrimination against foreign
ﬁrms. The exception is China, where there was initially very little prima facie evidence
of discrimination against foreign ﬁrms. Note that in Hong Kong, whereas prima facie ev-
idence was also weak, the econometric evidence suggests that the trademark registration
process can be used as a protectionist device.
Table 3 adds the aggregate import share variable, mc to the results provided in Table
2. Again our indicator of quality diﬀerence, ∆qi,c is negative and statistically signiﬁcant
in India, South Africa and Hong Kong (although in Hong Kong only at the 10 percent
level). Again in China, there seems to be no evidence of discrimination at this level. The
variable, mc which captures incentives for discrimination at the aggregate country level is
insigniﬁcant in both India and South Africa, signalling that most of the discrimination is
explained by quality diﬀerences at the industry/country level. However, in China and Hong
Kong, mc is positive and statistically signiﬁcant signalling discrimination at the country
level. Countries from where China and Hong Kong seem to import signiﬁcant amounts (and
t h e r e f o r em a ys h a r es i m i l a rt a s t ea n dp r o d u c es i m i l a rp r o d u c t s )f a c em o r ed i s c r i m i n a t i o n
in the trademark registration process.
6 Concluding Remarks
As traditional trade barriers, such as tariﬀs and quotas, have been eliminated in the de-
veloping world, much of the attention in the policy debate has shifted to the so-called
“behind-the-border” barriers to trade. Although it is diﬃcult to give a comprehensive
deﬁnition of this concept, it includes any policy or institutional setup that explicitly or
implicitly discriminates against foreign ﬁrms. The barrier explored in this paper is the
14potential capacity of trademark oﬃces to discriminate against foreign ﬁrms in the registra-
tion of their trademarks. By not allowing foreign ﬁrms to register their trademarks, these
institutions can reduce the capacity of the foreign ﬁrms to penetrate the home market.
Prima facie evidence for four developing countries suggests that there could be some
discrimination in the registration process against foreign ﬁr m si ns o m eo ft h e s ec o u n t r i e s .
A simple model is then developed to show that discrimination is more likely to occur
when products oﬀered by foreign ﬁrms are of similar quality to the ones produced by
domestic ﬁrms. This implication of the model is then tested for the four countries under
examination (China, Hong Kong, India and South Africa). Results are consistent with
the alleged trademark protectionism in three of the four countries, the exception being
China. It should be kept in mind, however, that the absence of protectionism in the
registration process is consistent with the presence of protectionism in the enforcement of
trademark law. One potential direction for future research is to explore the extent to which
enforcement of trademark legislation can also be used as a protectionist tool, in particular
in countries where there is little evidence of discrimination in the registration process.
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Appendix A - The Theory




















Applying the deﬁnition of net utility in (2), integrating and rewriting the breaking
points θ1, θ2 and θ3 in terms of quality levels and prices consistent with (4) yields
∆CS1 = −
[(q2 − q1)p(qd)+( q1 − qd)p(q2) − (q2 − qd)p(q1)]
2
2(q2 − q1)(q1 − qd)(q2 − qd)
(8)
The expression is negative since q2 >q 1 >q d and p(q) is strictly convex8.T h u s ,c o n -
sumers unambiguously lose from discrimination against country 1. The change in the
domestic ﬁrm’s proﬁts is










q1 − qd = q2 − q1 = qhigh − q2 = ∆q>0 (10)
















∆Π1 is strictly positive since is follows from the strict convexity of p(qd) that p(q1) <
1
2p(qd)+1
2p(q2).The change in social welfare as the result of discrimination against country
1i st h e n
∆W1 = ∆Π1 + ∆CS1 =




The government decides to discriminate against country 1 if ∆W1 > 0,w h i c hr e q u i r e s
π >p (qd)+p(q2) − 2p(q1). Assuming that π is high enough to induce discrimination,
the government discriminates and q1 disappears from the market. The next step for the
government is to decide whether discriminative action against country 2 should take place.
In this case the domestic ﬁrm gains additional market share θ4−θ2.F o l l o w i n gt h ea p p r o a c h
described above, the change in the total welfare from discriminating against q2 can be
calculated as
∆W2 = ∆Π2 + ∆CS2 =




To compare the welfare changes brought by the two cases of discrimination adopt the
following notation:
a = p(qd)+p(q2) − 2p(q1) (15)
18and
b = p(qd)+2 p(qh) − 3p(q2) (16)
Then







Using p(q)=q2 +π in (15) and substituting in q1 = qd +∆q and q2 = qd +2 ∆q,w h i c h
follows from (10), we obtain
a = q
2
d + π + q
2




d +( qd +2 ∆q)
2 − 2(qd + ∆q)
2 =2 ∆q
2 (18)
Similarly, expression (16) simpliﬁes to
b = q
2
d + π +2 ( q
2




d +2 ( qd +3 ∆q)
2 − 3(qd +2 ∆q)
2 =6 ∆q
2 (19)
Note that, in the special case of quadratic cost function C(q),ais exactly three times
smaller than b, regardless of the levels of π and ∆q.S i n c ea<b , it follows that at π = a
discrimination against country 1 leaves the home country’s welfare unchanged (∆W1 =0 ),
but further discrimination leaves the country strictly worse of (∆W2 < 0).
Substituting (18) and (19) into (17) and simplifying yields
∆W1 − ∆W2 =4 ∆q
2 (20)
S i n c ew ea s s u m e d∆q>0, the expression is strictly positive, implying that the change
in welfare becomes smaller as the government moves from discriminating against country
1 to discriminating against country 2 as well.
Following the same approach it can be shown that further discrimination (against a
hypothetical country 3) will produce a still smaller welfare change. It follows that if initially
19it is welfare-improving to discriminate, the incentives to do so diminish with the number
of brands, for which discrimination action is taken. The change in welfare continues to
drop the more brands disappear from the market, eventually becoming negative. This is
illustrated in Figure 7, where welfare changes are drawn as a function of π for a special case
of qd =1 ,q 1 =4 ,q 2 =7and qhigh =1 0 .A tπ =3 0 , for example, it is welfare improving to
discriminate against country 1, but the subsequent step to discriminate against country 2
would bring about losses. Already at this point the loss in consumer welfare outweighs the
proﬁt gain to domestic producers. The government stops to discriminate and allows the
higher quality goods to compete with the domestic brand.
N o t et h a tt h es a m et y p eo fa n a l y s i sc a nb ed o n ef o rt h ec a s ew h e nt h ed o m e s t i cg o o di s
the highest in quality, qd >q 1 >q 2 >q high. In this case the government also ﬁrst chooses
whether to discriminate against the country which is closest in quality to the domestic
brand and then whether to discriminate against the next country. The implications are the
same as before: it may be welfare-improving to discriminate against the closest competitor
(country 1), but further discrimination will produce smaller welfare gains, which eventually
turn into losses.
Appendix B - The Data
The data set used for this study includes trademarks, trade, production and tariﬀ data
for four countries (China, Hong Kong, India and South Africa), each of which is consid-
ered as the country of registration of brand names, and will hereafter be referred to as
“destination”). The data are at the industry level, covering the period from 1994 to 1998.
An average for this period is taken for every observation. The reason for this is that the
trademark registration process can often take more than one year and we therefore wanted
to avoid any biases due to the long delays that registration may often entail. In some of
the countries in our sample, the registration process can take easily two to three years.
Data on trademarks registrations and applications are disaggregated by country requesting
a registration (hereafter referred to as “source”).
20The sources of the trademarks data are the CD-ROM version of the 1998 WIPO data-
base on trademarks, and the 2002 World Bank Trademarks Database (Baroncelli, Fink
and Smarzynska 2003), also based on WIPO data. The sector disaggregation used here is a
combination of the Nice Classiﬁcation, the system used in both the WIPO and World Bank
sources, and the International Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (ISIC) at the three-digit
level, in which most of the output and trade data are reported. The ﬁnal industry classi-
ﬁcation has 22 sectors. The country source disaggregation is the one provided by WIPO
and discussed in Baroncelli, Fink and Smarzynska (2003). There are potentially 40 source
countries in WIPO’s database. The trade and production data necessary to construct the
export shares in the calculation of ∆qi,c come from the World Bank Trade and Production
Database (Nicita and Olarreaga 2001). The data have been integrated with updated data
from the United Nations Statistics Comtrade database as well as with the United Nations
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).
21Table 1: Trademark Protectionism: Pooled resultsa
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Diﬀerence in quality -0.13   -0.17   -0.14   -0.12   -0.16   -0.13  
(∆qi,c) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Import share 7.96   7.94   7.68  
(mc) (1.05) (1.08) (1.07)
Constant -0.09   No -0.10  
(0.01) (0.01)
Industry dummy No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Destination country dummy No No Yes No No Yes
R2-adjusted 0.01 0.09 0.12 0.01 0.09 0.13
# observations 1584 1584 1584 1584 1584 1584
aThe endogenous variable is given by the registration discrimination index against foreign ﬁrms, di,c.A l l
regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares. Figures in parenthesis are White-robust standard
errors. BB stands for signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level; and B for signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.Table 2: Trademark Protectionism by Countrya
China Hong Kong India South Africa
Diﬀerence in quality 0.04 -0.12   -0.20   -0.44  
(∆qi,c) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07)
Source country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2-adjusted 0.20 0.29 0.16 0.08
# observations 527 512 263 282
aThe endogenous variable is given by the registration discrimination index against foreign ﬁrms in each
of the four countries, di,c. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares. Figures in parenthesis
are White-robust standard errors. BB stands for signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level; and B for signiﬁcance at
the 5 percent level.Table 3: Trademark Protectionism by Countrya
China Hong Kong India South Africa
Diﬀerence in quality 0.02 -0.08? -0.21   -0.44  
(∆qi,c) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
Import share 17.14   5.28   2.22 1.99
(mc) (2.25) (1.68) (2.53) (4.62)
Source country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2-adjusted 0.21 0.29 0.16 0.08
# observations 527 512 263 282
aThe endogenous variable is given by the registration discrimination index against foreign ﬁrms in each
of the four countries, di,c. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares. Figures in parenthesis
are White-robust standard errors. BB stands for signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level; B for signiﬁcance at the
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: South Africa’s Index of Trademark Protectionism by Source Country
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*  θ 2 
Figure 5: Discrimination against Country 1
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qd=1, q1=4, q2=7, qhigh=10 
Figure 7: Change in Social Welfare from Discrimination against Countries 1 and 2
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